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The Two Majors Cope: The Boundaries of Nationality in Mid-18th Century Nova Scotia

The 1750s began ominously in Nova Scotia. In the spring of 1750 a company of French soldiers constructed a fort in a disputed border region on the northern side of the isthmus of Chignecto. The British built a semi-permanent camp only a few hundred yards away. The two armies faced each other nervously, close enough to smell each other's food. In 1754 a similar situation near the Ohio River led to an imperial war. But the empires were not yet ready for war in 1750, and the stand-off at Chignecto lasted five years.¹

In the early months of the crisis an incident occurred which illustrates many of the problems I want to discuss in this essay. On an autumn day in 1750, someone (the identity of this person remains in dispute) approached the British fort waving a white flag. The person wore a powdered wig and the uniform of a French officer. He carried a sword in a sheath by his side. Captain Edward Howe, the commander of the British garrison, responded to the white flag as an invitation to negotiations and went out to greet the man. Then someone, either the man with the flag or a person behind him, shot and killed Captain Howe.

According to three near-contemporary accounts of these events, the man in the officer’s uniform was not a Frenchman but a Micmac warrior in disguise. He put on the powdered wig and uniform in order to lure Howe out of his fort. The British officer would trust a Frenchman who invited him to talks. The warrior doubted that Howe would trust a Micmac, and so pretended to be French. As the British officer approached, the man with the flag shouted a greeting in perfect French, but he accompanied his words with gestures and expressions that no Frenchman would ever use. Howe stopped walking, and looked closely at the face of the man in front of him. He was turning to run when he was shot.²

¹ Several individuals gave me much-needed assistance and encouragement in prepaing this essay. I would like to thank Thomas Bader, Naomi Griffiths, Daniel Paul and William C. Wicken. I am also deeply in debt to Gillian Allen.


During the 1750s the politics of Nova Scotia centered on issues of national identity. At various times during the decade, the British engaged in combat with several different peoples who inhabited, or passed through, Nova Scotia: the Micmac, the French operating from the northern side of the Bay of Fundy and Cape Breton Island, and the Acadians. The British governors of Nova Scotia generally believed that they were surrounded by potential enemies, and they feared that the Acadians, the Micmac and the French would soon find a way to cooperate and overthrow British rule. One of the principal aims of British policy, therefore, was to keep these peoples separated, to isolate the Micmac, the Acadians and the French. To achieve this goal, the colonial authorities adopted two draconian policies. In 1749 the governor began offering bounties for the scalps of Micmac men, women and children. The aim of this programme was to eliminate the Micmac population on the peninsula of Nova Scotia, by death or forced emigration.  

3 Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 1 October 1749, in Akins, ed., Selections, pp. 581-2. Most of the historians who have discussed this policy have argued either that it represented nothing new, that the British had wanted to eliminate the Micmac since the moment they saw the peninsula of Nova Scotia, or that the bounty policy reflected a tactical response to a military crisis. Daniel N. Paul, We Were Not the Savages: A Micmac Perspective on the Collision of European and Aboriginal Civilizations (Halifax N.S., 1994) presents the first interpretation; Patterson, "Colonial Wars and Aboriginal Peoples", presents the second.

The bounty programme represented a sharp departure from the policies that prevailed in the 1730s and early 1740s, and therefore cannot be explained simply as a reflection of an unchanging British animus against the Micmac. But neither can it be explained simply as a response to a short-term military crisis, because Governor Edward Cornwallis, who announced the policy, began developing tentative plans to "root" the Micmac out of the peninsula of Nova Scotia in September 1749, while he was still performing his official duties on a ship anchored off the site of the future town of Halifax. His house and offices had not yet been built. Indeed, very little of Halifax existed. More importantly, none of the Micmac had taken up arms against the Governor or his settlement. There was no immediate military crisis at the time that Cornwallis developed his plan to exterminate or remove the Native people of the peninsula. See Edward Cornwallis to Board of Trade, September 1749, CO 217/9, doc 89, Public Record Office [PRO]. See also Hugh Davidson to Richard Aldworthy, 11 September 1749, CO 217/40, doc 172, PRO.

By calling the bounty policy a "programme" I do not mean to imply that it was a systematic, centrally planned, bureaucratic or efficient operation. It depended on private initiative, and, partly as a result, inspired only sporadic outbursts of violence. Shortly after Cornwallis announced his policy, a group of under-employed soldiers in Halifax formed a makeshift company to "hunt for Indians". No one gave them official orders. See John Salusbury, Expeditions of Honour: The Journal of John Salusbury in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1749-53, edited by Ronald Rompkey (Newark, Del., 1980), p. 68.

For background on the history of scalping in general, see two essays by James Axtell, "The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping? A Case Study", and "Scalping: The Ethnohistory of a
British adopted a different, but related, strategy: they deported the Acadians, relocating them in safer colonies to the west.⁴

Viewed in the abstract, these two programmes, to pay for the deaths of the Micmac and to relocate the Acadians and incorporate them into Anglo-American society, represented very uncomplicated thinking. The colonial authorities who endorsed these programmes placed the inhabitants of Nova Scotia into two categories, Europeans and savages, and treated them accordingly. But the simplicity is an illusion. The policy was never easy to enforce, in part because many of the Micmac and the Acadians physically evaded and resisted the military force of the colonial government; in part because the colonial authorities could not maintain the unanimity and single-mindedness of purpose necessary to pursue their policies to the end; in part, and this is the main topic of this essay, because the inhabitants of Nova Scotia refused to be categorized. Some individuals disguised themselves, adopting attributes associated with savagery or civility for the purpose of deception. Other individuals, innocent of any intention to deceive, defied classification.

The story of the man who killed Edward Howe illustrates some of the unintended effects of British policy in this period. By making it a capital crime to be Micmac, the British encouraged individuals to disguise themselves, cross cultural boundaries, put on wigs and speak French. The disguises tell us much about contemporary understandings of nationality. The Howe story, for example, suggests that hand gestures may have occasionally served as a strong indication of national identity.⁵ Other reports from this period place emphasis on many other aspects of culture and biology: language, religion, knowledge of geography, parentage and place of birth.⁶

Much of the best recent writing on the history of 18th century Nova Scotia has focussed on the self-definition of specific ethnic or national communities, but when addressing questions of identity, Nova Scotia’s historians have generally maintained strict allegiance to one or another of the province’s ethnic groups. Experts on Micmac history have concentrated on the Micmac, while other

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⁴ For the military strategy behind the deportation of the Acadians, see Patterson, “Colonial Wars”, pp. 145-7.

⁵ There is an extensive literature on the sign language used by the Native peoples of the Great Plains in the 19th and 20th centuries. See, for example, Brenda Farnell, Do You See What I Mean? Plains Indian Sign Talk and the Embodiment of Action (Austin, Texas, 1995); William Tomkins, Indian Sign Language ([1931], New York, 1969). Less has been written about the use of gesture among the Native peoples of Nova Scotia, but it appears that the Micmac had an elaborate vocabulary of signs which they continued to use at least through the early 1760s. See Ruth Holmes Whitehead, ed., The Old Man Told Us: Excerpts from Micmac History, 1500-1750 (Halifax, N.S., 1991), p. 163.

⁶ For an indication of the array of factors that entered into the determination of ethnic identity in Nova Scotia during the 1750s, see Anthony Casteel’s journal, May and June, 1753, in Abbé Henri-Raymond Casgrain, ed., Collection des documents inédits sur le Canada et l’Amerique (Québec, 1888), vol. 2, pp. 113-26. See also Paul, We Were Not the Savages, pp. 122-34; Whitehead, ed., The Old Man Told Us, pp. 132-6.
Historians have kept to the Acadians. The local English-speakers have intrigued a separate set of scholars, and the "Foreign Protestants", immigrants from the continent of Europe, have a historian of their own. Nova Scotia's history has been divided up, and this has placed limitations on our understanding of the problem of nationality.

Ethnic or national group-consciousness does not arise simply within isolated communities or individuals. It is not just (or even primarily) an internal feeling — it is an expression, something one communicates to others; and it is a way of perceiving others, of deciding whether a person is within or outside a particular national group. All three of these aspects of group identity — self-perception, self-presentation, and the analysis of neighbours and strangers — affect each other. To gain a full understanding of the Micmac in the 18th century, it is necessary to study the Acadians, the French, the New Englanders, the "Foreign Protestants" and the British. Similarly, any effort to understand the Acadians fully should entail studying the same set of groups. In short, the inhabitants of Nova Scotia need to be studied together.

The Howe story illustrates something else, equally important for historians. The 18th-century writers who claimed that a Micmac man-in-disguise killed Captain Howe were all French. It is possible that they concocted the tale, or repeated a story invented by someone else, in order to absolve the French of responsibility. Historians cannot fully trust these accounts of the killing. But neither should they lodge full confidence in any other account. During the violent, chaotic 1750s, a combination of fear, suspicion, anger and jingoism coloured nearly every description of the politics of Nova Scotia. Everyone who resided in the province had reason, often, to lie. The result was confusion, for policy-makers and for everyone else. In this essay I hope to examine that confusion, and its effect on the

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life of the province. But I will not try to resolve every factual uncertainty, many of which remain as persistent and intractable now as they were during the 1750s. It would be foolish to conduct a murder investigation in connection with the death of Captain Howe. We will never know, for certain, who killed him.\(^\text{10}\)

This essay presents two case studies to illustrate the problems that the British faced in trying to place the inhabitants of Nova Scotia into categories. They center on two figures, both of whom went by the name of “Major Cope”. The first “Major Cope”, a retired British army officer and an immigrant to New England, passed through Nova Scotia in the 1730s. The other “Major Cope” was a leader of a community of Micmac, and an important player in Nova Scotia politics during the 1750s. In part, this essay presents a before-and-after story. The two men rose to prominence under very different circumstances, and comparing their experiences will highlight distinguishing features of their times. But these men were more than exemplary. In very different contexts, each of them helped redefine the cultural and political boundaries that separated the peoples of Nova Scotia.

The first “Major Cope”, Henry Cope, was born in England in the closing years of the 17th century. As a young man he joined the army and served under the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession. Fairly quickly he attained the rank of Major, and he continued to use that title for the rest of his life. In 1715 he resigned his commission and soon thereafter moved to Boston. By the 1720s Cope was a successful merchant and an active member of Boston’s Anglican church. Sometime during the 1720s, either through the church, or through his business contacts, he met Paul Mascarene. Mascarene, a Protestant refugee from France, had participated in the British expedition that seized Acadia in 1710. He had remained active in the government of Nova Scotia ever since, and throughout his life he was one of the province’s most enthusiastic and active promoters.\(^\text{11}\) Mascarene probably encouraged Major Cope to seek his fortune in the east; in any case, Cope spent the 1720s engaged in trade with the fishing settlements of Newfoundland (where he held a minor government post after 1725), and in Nova Scotia.\(^\text{12}\)

During most of those years the inhabitants of Nova Scotia were at war among themselves. The Micmac took up arms against the colonial government in 1722, and fought in a coordinated effort with the Wabanaki Confederacy, a league of Native peoples engaged in a war with the New England colonies.\(^\text{13}\) That war ended

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ambiguous in 1725, but from the perspective of the British in Nova Scotia the
armistice did not bring security or social peace. The provincial government
remained unstable. Almost none of the inhabitants loved the British monarchy or
the colonial administration, and the authorities did not have sufficient coercive
power to rule without the inhabitants’ consent. In an effort to strengthen their
position, the officers of the Provincial Council spent the last years of the 1720s
haggling with the leaders of the Acadians, trying to convince them to swear
allegiance to Great Britain.

Cope, and many other observers of Nova Scotia, believed that everything
changed in 1729. In the fall of that year Richard Philips, the long-absent
Governor, visited the colony and entered into negotiations with the Acadian
community. At the end of the talks most of the French-speaking inhabitants agreed
to swear allegiance to the British monarchy in exchange for a promise that none of
them would be pressed into military service.14 This agreement seemed to indicate
that the various national groups inhabiting Nova Scotia had finally reached an
accommodation. Major Cope, and many others, now believed that the province
would enjoy social peace. With peace came opportunities.

Cope decided to take an active role in leading Nova Scotia to its brighter future.
Working with Mascarene and Andrew Le Mercier, the pastor of the French
Protestant church in Boston, Cope proposed recruiting at least 100 French
Protestant families to settle in Nova Scotia. They argued that their project would
help bring security and prosperity to the province. In all likelihood, they expected
the Huguenot settlers to take an active role in pacifying the Acadians. The
immigrants and the Acadians would share a language and a significant cultural
heritage. The two groups would be able to understand each other, and talk over
their differences. Over time, the Huguenots might have been able to persuade the
Acadians to accept Protestantism and British rule.15 But in any event, even if the

14 When the colonial government deported the Acadians in 1755, the Governor and Council justified
the action in part by arguing that the Acadians had never taken valid (i.e. unconditional) oaths of
allegiance. The campaigns to convince the Acadians to take the oath have therefore received an
enormous amount of scholarly attention. See George Rawlyk, “Cod, Louisbourg, and the
Acadians”, in Buckner and Reid, eds. The Atlantic Region, pp. 116-17; Brebner, New England’s
Outpost, pp. 89-99; Yves Cazaux, L’Acadie: Histoire des acadiens du XVIIe siècle à nos jours

15 In the formal petitions that have survived, Cope and Le Mercier did not discuss the effect of their
plans on the Acadians in any detail, but Cope’s subsequent actions make it clear that he wanted to
place the new Huguenot settlements at the eastern end of the Bay of Fundy, certainly near Minas
and probably also on the isthmus of Chignecto, in the midst of the Acadians’ villages. One of his
early allies on the Council, Paul Mascarene, was a Protestant Frenchman who did try to bring the
Acadians over to the Huguenot way of thinking. In the 1740s and 1750s other colonial speculators
would advance similar settlement schemes, and explicitly advance the idea that Protestant settlers
would convert their Acadian neighbours. Huguenots were generally seen as the Protestant people
most appropriate for the task. As early as 1711, one year after the conquest of Acadia, the
commander of the British garrison asked the Board of Trade to send him two Huguenot
missionaries to work among the Acadians. Paul Mascarene à Claude de la Vernede de St. Poncy,
Huguenots failed to convert the Acadians to Protestantism or alter their political outlook, their presence was expected to facilitate trade. Exploiting the advantages that their language and heritage gave them, New England's Huguenot merchants were already plying the waters between Boston and the Acadian settlements along the Bay of Fundy.

Cope and Le Mercier petitioned the governing Council of Nova Scotia to support them in their settlement scheme. Among other things they asked for land, and a promise that the new immigrants would be exempt from taxation for seven years. Governor Philipps, and most of the Council members, were happy with the proposal, and forwarded it to the Board of Trade. To emphasize his support for the plan, Philipps appointed Henry Cope to the Provincial Council and assigned him responsibility for overseeing the settlement project. The Governor also appointed a second Huguenot member to the Council — William Winniett — who, like Paul Mascarene, was a veteran of the conquest of 1710.

The appointment of Winniett represented a new departure for the Provincial Council. He differed from Paul Mascarene in several important respects. Both were Protestant Frenchmen, but Mascarene had joined the Anglican church and entered the elite of Boston society. Winniett had put down roots among the Acadians. Shortly after 1710 he had married Marie Madeleine Maisonnat, a daughter of the Acadian community. He and his wife travelled comfortably among both the English-speaking and the French-speaking inhabitants of Nova Scotia. William


Charles Bruce Ferguson, in his biography of Winniett in the DCB, vol. 2, pp. 665-6, hints that Winniett may have been a secret Catholic, though he does not cite any evidence for the suggestion. If he is right, Winniett successfully concealed his faith from everyone in the provincial government. It violated British law for Catholics to serve in government posts. Occasionally, Catholics surreptitiously enlisted in the military in violation of the law, but many British officials, including Governor Richard Philipps, considered this scandalous, and tried to ferret them out. No one ever accused Winniett of Catholicism, though many would have loved to expose him if he had been Catholic. Unquestionably, his family travelled in Protestant circles after he died. On the prohibition of Catholics from service in the army and government, see the oaths taken by the members of the garrison at Annapolis Royal, 12 December 1714 and 24 December 1714, CO 217/1, docs 350, 352, PRO. On Richard Philipps' efforts to bar Catholics from service, see Philipps to Captain Glidhall, 4 June 1737, Dredgar Park Mss., vol. 284, doc. 202, PANS; Philipps to James Mitford, 16 June 1738, Dredgar Park Mss., vol. 286, doc. 14, PANS. On Winniett's family after his death, see Mascarene to William Douglass, 20 August 1741, Mascarene Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society [MHS]; Pincombe, “Edward How”, in DCB, vol. 3, pp. 297-8.
had spoken French from childhood, and Marie had learned English. They both became merchants. Operating together and independently, the Winnietts made a fortune selling Acadian-grown produce to the British troops. The appointment of William Winniett to the Council, along with the endorsement of Cope’s plan to settle Huguenots among the Acadians, indicated that the councilmen were harbouring big plans. Philipps, Mascarene, Henry Cope and the others expected peace in the future, and a potentially profitable relationship with the French-speaking inhabitants of the province.

Over the next few years the councilmen ordered a survey of property boundaries throughout Nova Scotia in order to identify unclaimed land available for settlement. They commissioned the construction of a large store-house, 60 feet long, in Minas, one of the principal villages in the eastern region of the Bay of Fundy, an Acadian- and Micmac-dominated area where the British had never before built permanent facilities. They also ordered a road to be built, to connect Minas to the English-speaking capital, Annapolis Royal. The councilmen hoped that these projects would encourage British trade with the Acadians, but they also knew that the road would facilitate troop movements and that the storehouse could be used as a barracks in the event of an emergency. They wanted to secure the eastern region before any immigrants arrived. In the meantime they continued their negotiations with the Huguenot congregation in Boston.

Everyone expected these efforts to take time, but Major Henry Cope was an impatient man. Long before the preparations for the immigrants were complete, he invested a large sum of his own money in one of the regions targeted for settlement, establishing a coal mine at Chignecto, on the land bridge that linked the peninsula of Nova Scotia with the continent. Cope hired soldiers from the garrison as

19 It is likely also that they spoke Micmac. At least one of their children certainly did. Paul Mascarene, by contrast, did not speak Micmac. See William Pote, Jr., The Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr. (New York, 1976), p. 7.
20 The account books of the British garrison contain ample evidence of both Marie’s and William’s business activities. See the 40th Regiment’s ledger books, Dredge Park Manuscripts, vols. 257, 258, PANS. By consensus, Marie was understood to be the more astute and reliable business person. As Paul Mascarene put it, on the occasion of William’s death, “If Mr. Winniet had had an equal share of prudence to that of his wife he might at his death have been worth many thousands…” Mascarene to Douglass, 20 August 1741, Mascarene Family Papers, MHS. For an indication of Marie’s command of English, and her business activities, see Marie Winniett to her children, 1741, Mascarene Family Papers, MHS.
24 Armstrong to Deputies at Minas, 1 August 1732, CO 217/6, doc. 227, PRO.
25 Bell, Foreign Protestants’, pp. 43, 51-3; Advertisement to attract settlers from Boston, CO 217/6, doc. 218, PRO; Instructions for Mascarene, 11 September 1732, CO 217/6, doc. 219, PRO.
protection and temporary labour. His mine was open and producing coal by the summer of 1731.26

Very quickly, however, the scheme began to collapse. Acadian families threatened the surveyors who came to measure their lands. The surveyors fled with their work undone.27 Three Micmac men who identified themselves as Jacques Winaguadesh, Antoin and Andres, paid a visit to the carpenter who had agreed to build the storehouse. They told him that the Micmac still ruled the eastern end of the Bay of Fundy, and that they would not allow the construction of any new storehouses. The carpenter refused the commission.28 Then, in 1732, a group of men identified as Micmac destroyed Cope’s mine at Chignecto.29

Henry Cope spent the next several years trying to revive his mining venture. He petitioned dozens of political leaders and financiers in London, including Sir Robert Walpole, offering each man a share of the proceeds in exchange for a financial investment or political support.30 But Micmac resistance having resulted in the destruction of the first mine, no one wanted to risk investing in another. As one merchant explained to Cope, the “gentlemen” of London had “more certain ways to employ their cash at home”.31 At the same time that the mining project failed, the scheme to settle French Protestants in Nova Scotia collapsed. Intimidated, perhaps, by news of the Micmac actions, but wary also for other reasons, the Huguenots of Boston began looking for another colony.32

Major Henry Cope had suffered a severe disappointment and a financial


27 Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 10 January 1732, in MacMechan ed., Minutes, pp. 208-10; Armstrong to Board of Trade, 10 June 1732, CO 217/6, doc. 117, PRO; Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 4 September 1732, in MacMechan, ed., Minutes, p. 252.

28 Jacques Winaguadesh (the transcription of the name varies) appears on a 1708 census of the Micmac. He was an orphan, 17 years old, in 1708. He had one brother named Antoine, aged 10. The census lists two “sauvages des Mines” named Andres, a father and a son, aged 26 and 1, respectively. In 1732 Jacques would have been 41, Antoine 34, and Andres 25 or 50 (unless someone else named “Andres” was involved). The best French account of this incident indicates that four Micmac men spoke with the carpenter, but it does not name them. Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 25 July 1732, in MacMechan, ed., Minutes, pp. 238-41; “Recensement general”, novembre 1708, Ayers Mss. 751, Newberry Library [NL], pp. 11-13; Joseph de Montbeton de Brouillan dit Saint-Ovide au ministre, 14 novembre 1732, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 12, doc. 256, National Archives of Canada [NAC]; Conseil de la Marine, 9 février 1733, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 14, doc. 12, NAC.


30 King Gould to Armstrong, 1 June 1735, Dredegar Park Mss. vol. 284, doc. 115, PANS; Armstrong, et. al, to George Il, 13 July 1734, CO 217/39, doc. 120, PRO.

31 Gould to Henry Cope, 9 June 1737, Dredegar Park Mss. vol. 284, doc. 204, PANS.

32 Andrew Le Mercier eventually chose Sable Island, a small crop of land in the Atlantic, as an ideal colony. But he never obtained permission to settle his congregation there. Armstrong to Board of Trade, 10 April 1738, CO 217/34, doc. 34, PRO; Petition of Le Mercier, CO 217/34, doc. 34, PRO.
disaster. Whom did he blame for his failure? William Winniett. Cope suspected that Winniett, though a Protestant, had acted in league with the French Catholics to prevent the expansion of British influence in Nova Scotia. The Governor and Council accepted Cope’s claim that Winniett had intentionally incited the Acadians and the Micmac to violence. They ousted the Huguenot from the Council. Any historian reviewing this story would have to be careful drawing conclusions. In the early 1730s the English-speaking population of the province (excluding the distant fishermen on the Atlantic coast) stood at fewer than 100, almost all of them officers and enlisted men. The governors of Nova Scotia lived in a tiny community, often racked by frustration, cabin fever and murderous rage. It is likely that Cope’s condemnation of Winniett reflected burgeoning personal antagonism between the two men. Furthermore, it is impossible, from the record, to determine whether Cope’s charges were true. Maybe Winniett did, in fact, intentionally undermine Cope’s settlement scheme.

Despite these uncertainties, a few significant conclusions can be drawn from the story of Major Henry Cope. After the removal of William Winniett from the Council, and the collapse of the scheme to settle Huguenots in Nova Scotia, the English-speaking inhabitants of the province were largely cut off from the French-speaking community. To be sure, the Council still had one prominent Huguenot member, Paul Mascarene, and other French-speaking Protestants would occasionally join the provincial government. A few favoured French-speaking merchants continued to act as intermediaries between the Acadians and the British troops. But nearly a generation would pass before any effective measures would be taken to settle Protestant immigrants among the Acadians, or to construct new British-owned facilities in the Bay of Fundy region. Perhaps the only practical result of Henry Cope’s projects was to deepen the suspicions that divided the peoples of Nova Scotia. The English-speaking soldiers lived apart from the rest of the colony, isolated from the strangers who lived outside their gate.

Jean Baptiste Cope, the second “Major Cope”, first appears in the historical record in 1708, as a 10-year-old boy, the oldest child in a family of six. Two years before the British seized Acadia and renamed it Nova Scotia, a French Catholic missionary compiled a census of the Micmac residing near the principal French fort. He recorded Jean Baptiste’s name and age, along with those of his parents and

33 Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 25 July 1732, in MacMechan ed., Minutes, pp. 238-40; Armstrong to Board of Trade, 12 May 1734, CO 217/7, doc. 51, PRO.

34 In 1739 the Lieutenant Governor of the province died under unusually mysterious circumstances. He was found in his bed with several stab wounds in his chest. A coroner’s inquest, somewhat implausibly, ruled the death a suicide. John Adams to Board of Trade, 8 December 1739, CO 217/39, doc. 208, PRO; Boston Evening Post, 14 January 1740. The event triggered a bitter succession struggle that lasted years. See Moody, "A Just and Disinterested Man", p. 112.
three sisters, but the census records provide no other information about the family." The names themselves provide enough information to justify drawing some conclusions.

In the early years of the 18th century, in part under the influence of French missionaries, many Micmac men and women took on French names when they were baptized. In general they used the names when interacting with the Acadians, the French or the New Englanders, but they retained Micmac-language names as well. Presumably, within their own communities, the Micmac continued to rely primarily on their native-language names. But the Europeans and the colonists generally preferred to use names like "Jean" and "Paul" in conversation, and when they recorded the Micmac-language names, they treated them as surnames. "Cope" was a Micmac name, probably derived from the word "kopit", meaning "beaver".

It is likely that Jean Baptiste Cope had been baptized by the time he reached the age of 10. It is also likely that his family maintained close ties to the French-speaking community on the Bay of Fundy. This is suggested not only by the family's presence at the French fort in 1708, but also by Cope's particular given name. Informally, especially among those outside the regular clergy, John the Baptist served as something like the patron saint of New France, and whoever chose to give Cope that name (it could have been a missionary, or his parents or godparents, or even Cope himself if he was baptized as an older child) probably intended to use the name to express Cope's allegiance to the French. The accounts we have of Cope's life as an adult support these conclusions. He spoke French, and he and his Micmac associates described themselves as Catholics.

35 "Recensement général", novembre 1708, Ayers Mss. 751, p. 2, NL; Whitehead ed., The Old Man Told Us, p. 78. Whitehead identifies the census-taker as "Père LaChasse", but La Chasse recorded the entries for only a few Micmac communities, and not those on the peninsula of Nova Scotia. In Port Royal, the census-taker was probably Antoine Gaulin. See Whitehead ed., The Old Man Told Us, p. 79; "Recensement général", novembre 1708, Ayers Mss. 751, p. 27, NL; Wicken, "The Mi'kmaq and Wuastukwiuk Treaties", p. 247.

36 These comments are based primarily on the signature lines in treaties, on French missionary records, and on the minutes of the Council of Nova Scotia. See, for example, the copies of the treaty of 1726 contained in CO 217/4, PRO, and CO 217/38, PRO, and the treaty of 1749, RG1, vol. 163, doc. 10, PANS. See also Maillard, "Lettre", p. 410; Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 25 July 1732, in MacMechan ed., Minutes, pp. 238-41. See also "Recensement général", novembre 1708, Ayers Mss. 751, NL.

37 Whitehead ed., The Old Man Told Us, p. 78. See also the appendix.

38 In 1720 Father Antoine Gaulin claimed to have baptized everyone in the Micmac nation. "Relation de la mission du P. Antoine Gaulin dans le pays des micmaks et en Acadie vers 1720", microfilm copy, MG 3, Series K, doc. 114, NAC. [The original, which I have not seen, is at the Archives nationales, Paris: Section ancienne, Série K. Monuments historiques, carton 1232.]


Cope’s next, possible, appearance in the historical record dates from 1726. In that year, someone whom the British identified as “Jean Baptist” attended the negotiations that resulted in the first treaty between the British and the Micmac. When it came time for the Micmac men attending the conference to place their marks on the treaty (a gesture the British interpreted as a sign of assent) the man identified as “Jean Baptist” drew a totem in the shape of a beaver after his name. If this person was Jean Baptiste Cope (“Kopit” meant beaver in the Micmac language), then Cope had attained a position of leadership within the Micmac community at an unusually young age. It is possible that the man who drew the totem in the shape of a beaver was not Cope, or at least not the Cope who appeared on the 1708 census. He might have been the son of a man named Jean Baptiste fils de Bon, whose name appears directly above the simple name “Jean Baptist” reproduced in the appendix. Jean Baptiste fils de Bon had a son named Jean Baptiste, and the name directly below “Jean Baptist” on the treaty is “Etien fils de Baptiste Pon [Bon]”. Etienne marked his name with the totem of a beaver even though his father had used a star. It is possible that Jean Baptiste fils de Bon, Jean Baptiste, and Etienne fils de Baptiste Bon were grouped together on the signature lines of the treaty because they were all members of the same family. In that case, the boy identified as “Jean Baptiste Cop” in the 1708 census, the resident of the Port Royal area, may not have been the man who became known as “Major Cope” later in life. Jean Baptiste fils de Bon may have dropped his father’s surname and assumed the name Jean Baptiste Cope.

But if the man identified simply as “Jean Baptist” on the treaty was a member of the “fils de Bon” family, there does not seem to be any good reason why he was not designated as such, since Etienne was. Furthermore, there is no evidence that more than one person used the name Jean Baptiste Cope at any given time. We know that a man named Jean Baptiste Cope eventually became a leader of the Shubenacadie Micmac community, and by the arrangement of the names on the treaty, it appears that the man identified as “Jean Baptist” was a leader of that community in 1726. That fact lends support for the theory that I am favouring here, that the man whose totem appears in the appendix is Jean Baptiste Cope.

Jean Baptiste fils de Bon, and his children, are listed in “Recensement général”, novembre 1708, Ayers Mss. 751, p. 13, NL.

On the normal age for Micmac leaders, see Wicken, “Encounters”, p. 132.

41 See the appendix, which reproduces a copy of the signature line from the treaty found in CO 217/38, PRO.

42 Le Normant au ministre, 10 décembre 1722, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 6, doc. 74, NAC; Saint-Ovide au ministre, 24 novembre 1724, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 7, doc. 28, NAC.
30 Acadiensis

the peninsula. It became the site of two large annual festivals for the Catholic Micmac. On All Saints Day and Pentecost, hundreds of Micmac would come to the Shubenacadie, often from great distances.43

In 1737 Abbé Jean-Louis Le Loutre took over the Shubenacadie mission.44 Three years later, with the outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, Le Loutre assumed an active role supporting the French. He worked with Micmac warrior groups, and joined several parties in engagements with British forces.45 In 1748, after the European war ended, Le Loutre began a campaign to convince all the Acadians and all the Micmac to leave Nova Scotia. He led a significant portion of the Shubenacadie Micmac to French-ruled territory on Cape Breton Island, away from their ancestral homes. Other members of the Shubenacadie community refused to follow Le Loutre. Jean Baptiste Cope was among those who chose to stay.46

In the fall of 1752 Cope appeared before the British governor in Halifax and, speaking on behalf of the remaining people of the Shubenacadie, offered to make peace with the British Empire.47 As far as the historical record shows, it was at that moment, for the first time, that he assumed the title “Major”.

Compared to other hunting and gathering peoples in North America, the Micmac had an unusually formalized political structure. At least from the early 17th century onward, they divided their lands and appointed local leaders to preside within designated districts.48 In these respects, the Micmac resembled Europeans, but their leaders did not operate in the manner of generals or policemen or presidents or kings. They had very little coercive power, and could not unilaterally command obedience. As one early 19th-century observer put it, “whatever power [the Micmac leader] may possess, arises more from the ascendancy acquired by his mild and conciliating manners, than from any respect which the Indians pay to the office.


The French colonists did not understand the Micmac system of
government-by-consensus. Early in the 17th century they began identifying Micmac
leaders as “captains”, and using hierarchical military terminology to describe the
political system. Increasingly through the 18th century, Micmac leaders began
adopting the French usage and employing military terms to describe themselves. Captain was their most common title.

Why then did Jean Baptiste call himself “Major Cope”? As far as the historical
record shows, he only used the title when interacting with the British. In at least
one French document from 1754 he is “Captain Baptiste Cope”, and at other times
the French merely call him “Cop” or “Baptiste Coppe”. But among the British he
was Major. Almost certainly, Cope wanted to heighten his status when he spoke
with officials from the colonial government. The French sometimes granted
Micmac leaders the title “Major”; they never allowed a Micmac a higher rank. Cope
may have taken the best title available to him under the French system, or he
may have reviewed the careers of the French and British officers who had passed
through the province, Henry Cope and others, and concluded that the title “Major”
denoted a level of power and status sufficient to meet his needs.

One thing we know for certain: by 1752 Major Jean Baptiste Cope had adopted
a trilingual name. It was a name he acquired in pieces, as he encountered various
national groups. His name indicated something important about his character.
Jean Baptiste Cope moved all over Nova Scotia during the 1750s. He proceeded
from the offices of the British governor to the council fires of the Micmac, through
Acadian villages, to Catholic mission camps, and into the tents of the French
army. Most of the people he encountered along the way distrusted him. Every group

49 Edward Chappell, Voyage of His Majesty's Ship Rosmond to Newfoundland (London, 1818), p. 82,
quoted in Wicken, “Encounters”, p. 133.
50 Jacques de la Place (?), “Of What Occurred at Miskou”, 1645-6, in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The
Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New
51 Le Loutre to Armstrong, 9 September 1754, in Akins, ed., Selections, p. 216; Jean-Baptiste Louis
Le Prévost à Antoine-Louis Rouillé, 10 septembre 1752, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B,
Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 32, doc. 163, NAC; Le Comte de Raymond à Rouillé, 24
novembre 1752, in Baston du Bosq de Beaumont, ed., Les derniers jours de l’Acadie (Geneva,
1975), p. 72; Prévost à Rouillé, 12 mai 1753, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance
générale, Ile Royale, vol. 33, doc. 160, NAC; Prévost à Rouillé, 17 juin 1753, MG 1, Archives des
colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 33, doc. 182, NAC; “Divers dépense”,
Louisbourg, 31 décembre 1756, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile
Royale, vol. 36, doc. 241, NAC.
52 Charles Des Herbiers à Rouillé, 27 novembre 1750, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B,
Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 29, doc. 63, NAC; Des Herbiers à Rouillé, 6 décembre
1750, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 29, doc. 68,
53 Strictly speaking, “Major” is as much a French word as an English one, and the French did
designate certain Micmac leaders as “majors”. But for the reasons outlined in the preceding
paragraph, it seems likely that Cope was concerned with the way the title sounded in English.
54 For a different perspective on Jean Baptiste Cope, see Patterson, “Indian-White Relations”, pp. 35-
44. Patterson interprets Cope primarily as a player in an inherently rational game of power politics.
he met had reason to suspect that he was working for their enemies. And the rival nations of Nova Scotia feared each other deeply during the 1750s. Many of the leaders of the region, English- and Micmac-speakers particularly, were willing to kill individuals on the basis of their nationality.

The 1750s were a time of crisis in Nova Scotia. Partly as a result of new immigration, the political alliances and accommodations that had tenuously linked the various peoples of the province became unsteady, and the leaders of both the Micmac and the British communities re-examined the politics of the province in a harsh new light. A significant reordering began in 1749, when new settlers arrived on the Atlantic coast. The British Parliament had taken a sudden interest in the settlement of Nova Scotia, and over six years allocated hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling to subsidize the passage and subsistence of more than 5,000 Protestant immigrants. The government wanted the colonists to settle among the Acadians and gradually convert them to Protestantism and British culture. They were expected to play the role that Henry Cope probably planned for the Huguenots 20 years earlier.

Governor Edward Cornwallis, the man charged with executing this scheme, anticipated Micmac resistance. In the summer of 1749, to ward off trouble, he negotiated a peace agreement with Native leaders from the northern side of the Bay of Fundy. Then he directed the British commander at Fort George (on Casco Bay, in what is now Maine) to distribute food, blankets and other provisions to the Native peoples who came to his post. Cornwallis wanted peace in that region, and he also wanted to draw the Micmac away from the Acadians and his new Protestant settlers. Even as he negotiated a treaty with the peoples of the north shore of the Bay of Fundy, he planned to drive the Micmac from the peninsula, to

55 As I indicated at the outset, the British colonial government offered bounties for the scalps of Micmac men, women and children. The French also paid Micmac warriors for English scalps. For both the British and the Micmac, these policies forced fighting men to determine the nationality of their war captives. On the British bounty policy, see note 4, above. See also Instructions for Ezekiel Gilman, 4 October 1749, RG1, vol. 163, doc. 16, PANS; Cornwallis to Sylvanus Cobb, 13 January 1750, CO 217/9, doc. 209, PRO; Proclamation of Cornwallis, 21 June 1750, RG1 vol. 163, doc. 41, PANS; *Boston Evening Post*, 16 July 1750; Instructions for Patrick Sutherland, 29 May 1751, RG1, vol. 163, doc. 75, PANS; *Boston Gazette*, 5 July 1756. On the French bounty policy, see “Sur l’Acadie, 1748”, MG1, Archives des colonies C11D, Correspondance générale, Acadie, vol. 10, doc. 154, NAC; Prévost à Rouillé, 16 août 1753, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Île Royale, vol. 33, doc. 197, NAC; “Divers dépense”, Louisbourg, 31 décembre 1756, MG 1, Archives des colonies, C11B, Correspondance générale, Île Royale, vol. 36, doc. 241, NAC.

56 See generally, Patterson, “Colonial Wars”.


59 Treaty of 15 August 1749, RG1, vol. 163, doc. 10, PANS.

60 Receipt, 24 August 1751, RG1, vol. 430, doc. 2, PANS.
The Two Majors Cope

make the land available for colonization.\(^\text{61}\)

In his official correspondence at least, Cornwallis denied that he wanted to start a war for the peninsula. But if the Micmac chose to resist his expropriation of the land, he intended to conduct a war unlike any that had been fought in Nova Scotia before. The Governor outlined his thinking in an unambiguous letter to the Board of Trade. If there was to be a war, he did not want the fighting to end with a peace agreement. It would be better to “root” the Micmac out of the peninsula decisively and forever.\(^\text{62}\) The war began soon after the Governor made this statement. Cornwallis always claimed that the Micmac struck first, and he may have spoken the truth.\(^\text{63}\) The arrival of thousands of new settlers on Micmac lands may well have been enough to provoke various Micmac groups to attack.\(^\text{64}\)

At the same time that the British were adopting an uncomplicated, racially-based view of local politics, several leaders of the Micmac community were adopting a similar stance. They too were thinking about issues of race and geography, and by the end of 1749 many of them had concluded that the British, because of their foreign ancestry, had no right to occupy any land in Nova Scotia. In the fall of 1749 several Micmac leaders (the records do not indicate whether Jean Baptiste Cope was among them) met with a British emissary in nominally French territory, on Cape Breton Island. For three days, the men debated their response to the establishment of new British settlements. At the end of the talks a French missionary, who had been present throughout, drafted a statement which he said conveyed the result of the discussions. Almost certainly, some of the Micmac at the discussions spoke French.\(^\text{65}\) The British emissary would have read the transcription to them to verify its accuracy. There is good reason, therefore, to believe that the statement reflected the will of the group.\(^\text{66}\)

Some historians have likened the document to a declaration of war.\(^\text{67}\) The Micmac declared that the peninsula of Nova Scotia belonged to the “savages”, a distinctive race literally born from the land. “I am sprung from the land as doth the

\(^{61}\) See note 3, above.

\(^{62}\) Cornwallis to Board of Trade, September 1749, CO 217/9, doc. 89, PRO. See also Davidson to Aldworth, 11 September 1749, CO 217/40, doc. 172, PRO.


\(^{64}\) The Micmac also had recent grievances to avenge, including the alleged murder of 20 women and children near Canso (by unidentified “Englishmen”) in the summer of 1749. See Des Herbiers à Rouillé, 9 août 1749, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Île Royale, vol. 28, doc. 77, NAC.

\(^{65}\) See Le Loutre to Lawrence, 9 September 1754, in Akins, ed., Selections, p. 216. See also Leonard Christopher Rudolf’s Journal, beginning 1 June 1757, LO 3765, Huntington Library.

\(^{66}\) Boston Evening Post, 4 December 1749; Dickason, Louisbourg, p. 131; Salusbury, Expeditions, pp. 65-6; Johnson, Apôtres ou agitateurs, pp. 113-14.

\(^{67}\) Dickason, “Amerindians”, p. 42; Paul, We Were Not the Savages, p. 109; Patterson, “Indian-White Relations”, pp. 30-1; Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, p. 51; Casgrain, ed., Collection, vol. 1, p. 17.
grass. I that am savage, am born there, and my fathers before me. This land is mine inheritance, I swear it is, the land which God has given me to be my country forever.68 Over the next few months the leaders of the Micmac resistance repeatedly emphasized their status as “savages”, and soon they began to claim that they represented all the Native peoples of North America.69

If the proclamations of 1749 were our only source of information about political thought in Nova Scotia during the war that followed, we would be justified in assuming that the combatants understood their conflict in starkly simple terms, that everyone involved understood the conflict as a race war, and that the Micmac and the British were singlemindedly determined to drive each other from the peninsula of Nova Scotia.

The war may have begun that way, but after two years of inconclusive fighting, uncertainties and second thoughts began to disturb both the Micmac and the British communities. By the summer of 1751 Governor Cornwallis and his advisors had begun to doubt whether it was tactically feasible, or advisable, to eliminate the Micmac altogether from the peninsula.70 They developed an alternative strategy, involving the construction of trading posts and forts designed to control the Micmac and to exploit them economically.71 This more conciliatory policy gained tacit support from the Board of Trade, which had mildly reprimanded Cornwallis in 1750 for his harshness.72 For more than a year, from the summer of 1751 through the summer of 1752, Cornwallis sought out Micmac leaders willing to negotiate a peace.73 The fighting subsided for a while — an encouraging sign — but Cornwallis gave up, resigned his commission and left the province before any of the Micmac leaders on the peninsula accepted the government’s invitation to talks. The first willing negotiator was Major Jean Baptiste Cope.

Cope claimed to represent the Shubenacadie Micmac, and, acting on behalf of

68 This is the translation that appeared in the Boston Evening Post, 4 December 1749.
69 In various statements addressed to the Acadians and the British, the Micmac resistance leaders identified themselves as “Nous les sauvages”, and “Tous les sauvages” and they specified that they represented “Micmacs, Mariches, Canbres, Hurons, Abenaquis et Exquimaux et le reste”. CO 217/9, doc. 202, CO 217/40, doc. 145, PRO. Various Micmac spokesmen had made declarations of sovereignty before, but the statements of 1749 were different. The earlier statements made no reference (even through the use of metaphor) to biological differences between Europeans and Native peoples, and they did not assert a common interest between the Micmac and all the other aboriginal nations of the continent. See David Jeffries and Charles Shoprove to Robert Mours, 6 July 1715, CO 217/2, doc. 5, PRO; John Doucette to Board of Trade, 10 June 1718, CO 217/2, doc. 207, PRO; Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 25 July 1732, in MacMechan, ed., Minutes, pp. 238-41; Saint-Ovide au ministre, 14 novembre 1732, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 12, doc. 256, NAC; Conseil de la Marine, 9 février 1733, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 14, doc. 12, NAC.
70 Cornwallis to Mascarene, 13 August 1751, HM 27646, Huntington Library; Mascarene to Cornwallis, 27 August 1751, CO 217/13, doc. 27, PRO.
71 The fullest statement of this strategy can be found in George Scott to Peregrine Hopson, 17 August 1752, CO 217/12, doc. 292, PRO; see Patterson, “Indian-White Relations”, p. 38.
72 Paul, We Were Not the Savages, p. 111; Cornwallis to Board of Trade, 19 March 1750, CO 217/9, doc. 188, PRO.
73 Patterson, “Indian-White Relations”, pp. 35-6; see also Boston Evening Post, 22 July 1751.
that community only, he negotiated a treaty. The new Governor, Peregrine Hopson, wanted a more comprehensive agreement, and asked Cope to recruit other Micmac leaders to join the peace. Responding positively to the Governor's request, during the fall of 1752 and spring of 1753 Jean Baptiste Cope, with his son Joseph, helped arrange meetings between British emissaries and various Micmac leaders. The British delegations, composed primarily of soldiers, travelled east of Halifax to Micmac fishing camps, carrying gifts and offers of friendship, to persuade the leaders of the Micmac bands to come to Halifax and ratify the peace. One individual man accepted the invitation. The Governor was disappointed with this meagre response, and became increasingly sceptical about Cope's influence among the Micmac on the peninsula. Then he heard disturbing news.

In the spring of 1753 a delegation of soldiers left Halifax to meet with Cope, and disappeared. Only one of the travellers, a man named Anthony Casteel, returned. He testified before Council that Cope and his followers had ambushed the emissaries, captured and systematically killed them. The Shubenacadie Micmac had joined forces with the French. Casteel testified that Cope and his followers now carried French passports and orders from a French general. Jean Baptiste Cope himself had celebrated the humiliation and slaughter of the British soldiers. According to Casteel, the Micmac leader had boasted of his trickiness and claimed that he had made friendly overtures to the government in order to instill false confidence and make the British vulnerable to surprise.

Governor Hopson and the Council were reluctant to believe Casteel's testimony. They did not want to admit that their diplomatic efforts had failed, and they had good reason to suspect Casteel, who described himself as a creative liar. Subsequent commentators, historians, folklorists, lawyers and Native activists have shared the Council's uncertainty over Casteel's testimony and its significance.

76 Patterson, "Indian-White Relations", p. 43.
77 Hopson to Board of Trade, 6 December 1752, Add. 19,072, doc. 9, British Library; Hopson to Board of Trade, 4 January 1753, CO 217/14, doc. 3, PRO.
79 Their scepticism is revealed by their insistence that Casteel repeat his statement in deposition form, under oath. They may have suspected the translator of complicity in the death of the soldiers, or of cooperating with the Micmac. Soldiers who accepted adoption into Micmac bands in the 1750s faced charges of desertion. Those found guilty were hanged, and their bodies were hung in chains to serve as an example to others. See, for example, Instructions for John Gorham, 12 May 1750, RG1, vol. 163, doc. 30, PANS; Death Warrant for James Spier, George Gibson and Samuel Fox, 24 May 1750, RG1, vol. 163, doc. 39, PANS.
for our understanding of Jean Baptiste Cope. Nevertheless, enough corroborating documentation exists to give credence to several of the details of Casteel’s account. And there is good evidence that in later years Cope took up the fight against British rule. But even if Casteel told the entire truth, and Cope participated in the ambush against the 1753 diplomatic mission, we have no way of knowing his motives for doing so.

Perhaps Cope entered into the 1752 treaty in good faith, and became disillusioned later. He may have concluded that the provincial government reneged on its treaty obligations by failing to suppress violence against the Micmac. Only a few days before Casteel’s delegation was seized, two British sailors marooned on the Atlantic coast had killed seven Micmac, including three women and two children. In light of that incident and others, Cope may have lost faith in the prospect of peace.

Then again, it is possible that Cope still believed in the value of his peace agreement, even after the killings. He may have tried to persuade his compatriots to accept his treaty’s terms, but discovered that he could not convince them to do so, particularly not after the recent violence. Cope’s support of the peace agreement may have undermined his credibility and power among the Micmac. Perhaps he did not want to resume the fight against the British, but agreed to do so only reluctantly, after listening to the counsel of others.

In the years since these events, Major Jean Baptiste Cope has become an important figure in the collective memory of the Micmac people. For years he was

80 For example, Casteel reported meeting the Acadian merchant Jacques Maurice at Baye Verte. Other contemporary correspondence confirms that Maurice was there at the time that Casteel indicated. De la Houssay à Michel le Courteois, Sieur de Surlaville, 12 mai 1753, in De Beaumont, ed., Les derniers jours, p. 89. Also, a group of Micmac warriors arrived at Louisbourg with 18 British scalps in the summer of 1753. It is quite possible that six of them came from Casteel’s companions. Prévost à Rouillé, 16 août 1753, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 33, doc. 197, NAC. Other sources corroborating details in Casteel’s narrative include Prévost à Rouillé, 12 mai 1753, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 33, doc. 161, NAC; Prévost à Rouillé, 17 juin 1753; MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 33, doc. 181, NAC.

81 In 1754, according to the missionary Jean-Louis Le Loutre, Jean Baptiste Cope took advantage of his command of French and acted as a spokesmen for the Micmac in their relations to the Acadians. His message was simple: abandon the British-ruled province and move to New France. In 1756, according to the records of the French army at Louisbourg, Cope received 60 livres for two British soldiers’ scalps. Le Loutre to Lawrence, 9 September 1754, in Akins, ed., Selections, p. 215; “Divers dépense”, Louisbourg, 31 décembre 1756, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 36, doc. 241, NAC.

82 Casteel reported that one of his captors gave this explanation for Cope’s actions. Casteel’s journal, Casgrain, ed., Collections, vol. 2, p. 118. For other accounts of the incident, See Nova Scotia Council Minutes, 16 April 1753, in Akins, ed., Selections, pp. 694-6; Halifax Gazette, 21 April 1753, 28 April 1753; Boston Evening Post, 7 May 1753; see also Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, p. 55.

83 Support for this theory can be found in Prévost à Rouillé, 10 septembre 1752, MG 1, Archives des colonies C11B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 32, doc. 165, NAC.
remembered as an unreliable man, an impulsive actor and a deceiver. One story, recorded in the 1760s, claimed that it was Cope who had put on the powdered wig to shoot Captain Howe. According to another story, Cope took up arms in 1753 for a trivial reason: a noisy British soldier had kept him awake one night. The legend describes Jean Baptiste Cope firing a musket in the fog, killing the soldier and slipping away undetected. A Micmac story-teller in 1916 summed up the import of these stories succinctly: “Chief J.B. Cope was a bad Indian and tricky”.

But recently a different image of Cope has emerged. Over the last 25 years various Micmac individuals, bands and larger collective organizations have re-examined the treaty that Cope negotiated in 1752, and have recognized it as a potential source for legal rights. The treaty confirmed the Micmac’s freedom to hunt and fish without interference from the provincial government, and also guaranteed them annual, material aid. As a way of honouring the treaty, enhancing its authority and celebrating it, various writers and activists have described Cope as a leader and spokesman for all the Micmac, across the peninsula of Nova Scotia and beyond. They have also denied that he ever unilaterally abrogated his agreements.

Neither of these images of Jean Baptiste Cope, as trickster or statesmen, does full justice to the historical record. They are too simple and too easy to understand. The one characteristic that every contemporary observer associated with Cope was indeterminacy. He was unclassifiable, and in the mid-1750s maintaining an ambiguous position was an unusually radical stance. Undefined people cannot be stereotyped, and without a sturdy stereotype policies of indiscriminate violence are difficult to maintain. After Cope ratified the treaty of 1752, the British never returned to their old policy of driving the Micmac off the peninsula. Instead, the government searched for “friendly Indians”, and alternated self-consciously between violence and negotiation, always distinguishing between Micmac bands. By confusing the British, briefly upsetting their negative expectations and providing a short-lived, tantalizing offer of reconciliation, Jean Baptiste Cope helped change Nova Scotia’s politics forever.

What conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the comparison of the two Majors Cope? When I began my research for this essay I suspected that the second “Major Cope”, Jean Baptiste, had taken his title with Henry Cope in mind. It was fairly common in other Algonkian and Iroquoian nations in the 17th and 18th centuries, for individuals to adopt the names of prominent, departed persons, in an effort to acquire status and power. Gregory Evans Dowd and Daniel K. Richter have argued

84 “A short account of what passed at Cape Breton, from the beginning of the last War until the taking of Louisbourg in 1758, by a French Officer”, in Akins, ed., Selections, pp. 195-6.
85 Whitehead, ed., The Old Man Told Us, p. 127.
86 Whitehead, ed., The Old Man Told Us, p. 140.
87 See Paul, We Were Not the Savages, pp. 222-6.
that this naming practice reflected a very specific set of spiritual beliefs: when one person assumed another person’s name, he or she also acquired the spiritual power of the namesake. In a very real sense, one person adopted the spirit of another. It struck me as an intriguing problem, that Jean Baptiste Cope had apparently chosen the name of one of the most aggressively ambitious English-speaking speculators of the 1730s.

I am not so certain now that Jean Baptiste Cope named himself after Henry. “Kopit” served as a name in the Micmac language, and, in any case, Jean Baptiste was travelling by that name long before Henry arrived in Nova Scotia. The fact that both men used the title “Major Cope” may be largely a coincidence. But it does draw attention to Jean Baptiste’s use of the title “Major”. He may have adopted it in part because the earlier Cope had used it and gained power and respect from it. More generally and abstractly, his use of the title “Major”, along with the use of other titles by other Micmac leaders, represented a partial adoption of European styles of hierarchy and political authority within the Micmac community. The Micmac still operated on a system of government-by-consensus in the mid-18th century, but their system of government was changing. Largely under European influence, Micmac leaders were adopting titles such as “chief”, “captain” and “judge”. According to one description of the Micmac polity in the 19th century, there were four tiers of authority within each Micmac band. “Major” had become a regular political office, below the level of “chief”. The word had come to mean “second-in-command”.

By adopting the title “Major” (albeit probably without all the trappings of its 19th-century meaning) Jean Baptiste Cope took one step toward making the Micmac political system resemble that of the British. His short-lived peace agreement with the provincial government represented a more consequential step in the same general direction. Cope’s overtures to Governor Hopson encouraged the English-speaking leaders of Nova Scotia to think that they could live with the Micmac, or at least with some of them, and that the Native peoples of the peninsula did not have to be exterminated or expelled. Whether he intended to or not, Cope altered the patterns of thought surrounding race relations in the colony.

It may be an odd coincidence, but the two Majors Cope confronted very similar issues during their political careers, and Jean Baptiste Cope helped reverse a pattern of thinking that Henry Cope had helped establish. The practical result of Henry’s activities in Nova Scotia had been to isolate the English-speaking colonists, to make them wary of alliances with “foreign” peoples of any kind. Jean Baptiste, by comparison, despite the ambiguous end of his career, was a bridge-builder, and he made the British more willing to contemplate a future in which peoples of different


90 Joseph Howe Letter-Book, November 1841 to 21 June 1843, 432 doc. 15, PANS.
cultures lived side-by-side amicably, and benefited from interaction.

By no means do I intend to suggest that these two men introduced entirely new ideas into their respective societies, or that they single-handedly changed patterns of political thought in the province. The differences between the men, to a great extent, reflected changes in thought throughout the Anglo-American and Native North American worlds of the 18th century. In the 1740s and 1750s most of the English-speaking colonists and many of the Native peoples of the province were engaged in a highly contentious debate over issues of national identity. In both the Native and colonial contexts, the debate pitted advocates of particularism and small political communities against those with a broader, more cosmopolitan (though often racially-based) understanding of nationality. In the early years of the 18th century, when Henry Cope arrived in Boston, many of the New Englanders and the English-speaking immigrants continued to identify only with New England or the English-speaking nation. By the 1750s, a more flexible and accommodating idea of nationality was gaining dominance in political discussions. Scots, and immigrants from all over Europe, were gradually gaining acceptance as members of the British Empire.91

These intellectual and political developments had an odd mix of consequences for Native peoples. Increasingly, in mid-century, many observers of North American politics, British and Native alike, believed that two monolithic races were engaged in a struggle for the land, that all the Europeans and colonists had a common interest, that all the Native peoples had a common interest, and that ever since the colonists arrived in North America the two groups had been irreconcilably opposed to each other. Native peoples may have come to this understanding of North American history sooner than the colonists did.92 But neither among the Native peoples, nor among the colonists, was this racialized view ever universally shared. To the extent that Jean Baptiste Cope sincerely wanted peace with the British in 1752, he represented a countervailing trend in Native thought. He sought to redefine the new cosmopolitanism of the British, to claim a place for the Micmac within, or at least beside, the English-speaking world.

APPENDIX

Jean Baptiste