

family context, a significant omission since the household has served so consistently as women's domain. Deborah Gorham has recently published *The Victorian Girl and the Feminine Ideal*³⁶ which draws upon British sources but we need a similar study for Canada where class and society for the same period were markedly different. Families and households are also the settings where power relationships are established by means both peaceful and violent, legal and illegal. These power relations and their public manifestations must be studied historically; so, too, the concept of motherhood as it is defined in various cultures.³⁷

Ethnic and migration studies will also benefit from a feminist perspective.³⁸ All too often, one looks in vain for a breakdown by gender in tables on immigration. Such information provides important clues to questions of culture and assimilation as well as motivation for uprooting. More important, women often experience migration differently from men and their stories must also be told. Similarly, studies of rural outmigration frequently discuss only men on the move, though census figures suggest that it was often women who led the stampede to the cities where they could receive wages for the jobs they traditionally performed without pay at home.

It would be possible to go on indefinitely listing areas to be challenged by a feminist point of view. What is clear is that the hearty grasp of Canadian women's history in 1983 has far exceeded its tentative reach in 1973. Though a few purists may be dismayed by the melange of activities and methodologies comprising the field, its eclectic quality is part of its strength in re-viewing a world too long controlled — and therefore defined — by half the human race.

MARGARET CONRAD

36 (Bloomington, Indiana, 1982).

37 Canadian scholars wondering how family history and women's history interact would do well to turn to two British monographs: Jane Lewis, *The Politics of Motherhood: Child and Maternal Welfare in England, 1900-1939* (Montreal, 1980) and Diana Gittins, *Fair Sex: Social Change and Family Structure: Women, Work and the Decline of Family Size, 1900-1939* (London, 1982).

38 See a special issue of *Ethnic Studies*, XIII, 1 (1981) devoted to ethnicity and femininity and edited by Danielle Juteau-Lee and Barbara Roberts.

Canada's Naval War

ONE OF CANADA'S most remarkable military achievements was its contribution to the Allied Victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1945. From a pre-war force of 11 warships and 1,800 professionals, by 1945 the Royal Canadian Navy grew to include more than 450 ships of various types and nearly 100,000 all ranks. The RCN had assumed sole responsibility for anti-submarine escort of

North Atlantic trade convoys by 1944, and made considerable contributions to other major naval campaigns in the last two years of the war. Despite the growth and strategic significance of the RCN in the Second World War, our naval war remains relatively unexplored and poorly understood. A recent survey of *Canada and War* (Toronto, Butterworths, 1981) by the *wunderkind* of Canadian military history, Desmond Morton, devotes only five of its 200 pages to the major campaign fought by the RCN just off the Canadian coast.

Perhaps the most telling evidence of our poor understanding of the RCN's war is John Swettenham's last book, *Canada's Atlantic War* (Toronto, Samuel Stevens, 1979). Swettenham set out to "give a clear picture of the overall battle and Canada's part in it". But both the text and the photos, of which there are many, reflect the standard British interpretation of the Battle of the Atlantic. Swettenham makes no mention of the "Gulf Escort Force", which looked after the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the "Western Local Escort Force", which shepherded convoys between U.S. ports and Cape Race, or of the escorts which Canada lent to British and American commands. At some points the book is actually wrong or misleading. The chapter on corvettes, "The Ship that Won the War", contains 16 pictures, but only five are of corvettes. One photo, "Stoking a Corvette", is simply wrong: none of the RCN's corvettes were coal-fired!¹

Canada's foremost military historians have been unable to integrate the expansion, difficulties and accomplishments of the RCN into their accounts of either the war at sea or the national war effort. Nor have they been able to make the RCN come alive as a dynamic force in the Battle of the Atlantic. Indeed, it is remarkable that a comprehensive book, based on original sources and written by an independent author, has never been published on the subject of the RCN and the Battle of the Atlantic. The contrast with the ink spilled over Vimy Ridge and Dieppe is startling.

C.P. Stacey has recounted how the original operational history of the RCN was suspended in 1947 by the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton.² Gilbert Tucker, the Navy's official historian, had planned a three-volume work and by the late 1940s the first two volumes were ready. These were published as *The Naval Service of Canada* in 1952. Despite some revisionist articles in J.A. Boutilier's recent collection, *The RCN in Retrospect* (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1982), Tucker's first volume remains the standard work on the Navy's first 29 years. The second volume is useful for its attention to wartime ship construction, base development, control of merchant shipping and other administrative tasks, but has not found favour among historians of the

1 The photo originally appeared in W.H. Pugsley, *Saints, Devils and Ordinary Seamen* (Toronto, 1945) in a chapter on small ships which included discussion of corvettes and the Navy's small coal-fired ships.

2 C.P. Stacey, "The Life and Hard Times of an Official Historian", *Canadian Historical Review*, LI (March 1969), pp. 21-47.

Battle because it fails to draw clear links between activities ashore and events at sea. Presumably Tucker intended to link the narrative in Volume II with the discussion of operations in the succeeding volume; the decision not to proceed with the operational study left *The Naval Service of Canada* incomplete. The Naval Historian's notes and drafts for the operational history were handed to Joseph Schull, who was given one year to produce a popular account of the Navy's fighting. The result was *The Far Distant Ships*,³ a marvellously readable narrative of the RCN's exploits. However, history could not possibly have been more badly served than by the publication of a totally uncritical, upbeat chronicle of the fleet's most memorable moments.

The salient theme of the official histories is the sheer size of the RCN upon completion of its wartime expansion. The theme is in keeping with the general post-war view of the nature of Canada's war effort: large military and naval forces coupled with a major industrial effort. Although Canada could field a large Army which had ample time to train, and equip both it and a fair proportion of Commonwealth forces with standardized equipment on a massive scale, this approach was not consistent with the needs of a changing naval campaign off the Canadian coast. Canada could produce the basic warships (to mercantile standards), as well as unsophisticated weapons and ancillary equipment to permit naval expansion, but the electronics and modern equipment needed to keep pace with the changing tactical environment were not forthcoming. Although *The Naval Service of Canada* contains scattered evidence of this problem in its discussion of technical liaison and fleet maintenance, nowhere, least of all in Schull's book, do the very grave consequences of Canada's inability to support the Navy qualitatively emerge.

The first critical discussion of the wartime RCN appeared in 1956. Captain Donald MacIntyre, RN, was an accomplished escort commander and a North Atlantic veteran. His memoir, *U-Boat Killer*,⁴ contained a savage assault on the RCN. Indeed, the first five pages of Chapter 7 remain the most damning criticism of the RCN in print. MacIntyre described Canadian escorts as "travesties of warships" and Canadian convoy battles as "wild and confused". The RCN's historians wanted to publish a rebuttal, but the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear Admiral H.G. DeWolf, refused to allow it. The wartime Navy at least knew there was truth in MacIntyre's charges. *U-Boat Killer* has become the most influential version of the RCN and the Battle of the Atlantic. While the basis of his thesis was the RCN's enormous expansion, MacIntyre believed that unbridled growth led to inefficiency and in turn to unacceptable losses to Canadian-escorted convoys. His interpretation has been widely accepted by historians. The classic example of the application of the MacIntyre

3 Joseph Schull, *The Far Distant Ships* (Ottawa, 1950). A second, revised edition appeared in 1952.

4 Donald MacIntyre, *U-Boat Killer* (London, 1956).

thesis is Terry Hughes and John Costello, *The Battle of the Atlantic*,⁵ an otherwise fine synthesis of secondary sources up to 1977. This large book contains only two paragraphs on the RCN. The first describes the enormous wartime growth of the Navy, and the second illustrates with figures of losses how inefficient the RCN really was.

By the 1970s there was another theme apparent in the RCN's war: the equipment crisis. The problem of outdated equipment was briefly tackled by Tucker, but it was not until the publication of C.P. Stacey's *Arms, Men and Governments*⁶ that the equipment crisis gained notoriety. Stacey produced hard evidence to show how outdated equipment affected operations and the performance of the fleet. Unfortunately, Stacey's account has had little impact on most histories. Only one recent history of Canada and the Second World War has attempted to integrate the equipment crisis into a general discussion of the Battle.⁷

Scholars searching for material on the convoy and U-Boat war will find little of value in Canadian memoirs, though British memoirs and biographies have very usefully tackled the central issues of the campaign: tactics, training, technology, and innovation.⁸ Most Canadian memoirs have been authored by reservists: men who were taken up by the sheer experience of naval life and going to sea. The best Canadian memoir and likely to remain a classic is Alan Easton's *50 North*.⁹ Easton was an experienced merchant seaman, a very capable commander and an intelligent observer. He also held a responsible position during the early trying days of the war, characteristics which give his book lasting value.

Other Canadian memoirs are much less satisfactory. Jeffrey Brock's *The Dark Broad Sea* (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1981) recounts the exploits of a Canadian seconded to the Royal Navy, something which makes the work unique and valuable. But the book is full of contrived dialogue and imprecision, and so must be read with caution. Rear Admiral H.N. Lay's *Memoirs of a Mariner* (Stittsville, Ontario, Canada's Wings, 1982) were, as the author readily admits, written for his family and close friends. Although arranged chronologically, Lay's reminiscences ramble badly and are riddled with error. Hal Lawrence's *A Bloody War* (Toronto, Macmillan, 1979) is an excellent little book, since Lawrence has a story to tell and he does it well. His exploits with the corvette *Oakville* in the Caribbean are the stuff of legends. If

5 (New York, 1977).

6 (Ottawa, 1970).

7 W.A.B. Douglas and B. Greenhouse, *Out of the Shadows* (Toronto, 1979).

8 For example see Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, *Convoy Escort Commander* (London, 1964) and D.A. Rayner (a Royal Navy reservist) *Escort* (London, 1955), one of the best memoirs of the Battle.

9 A.H. Easton, *50 North: Canada's Atlantic Battleground* (Toronto, 1966).

Oakville had been an American warship, Errol Flynn would probably still be making that harrowing leap to the deck of *U94* every so often on the late movie. Unfortunately for Lawrence he is a Canadian, and we still have insufficient interest in home-grown heroes. Further, despite its quality, *A Bloody War* will not make a lasting impression on the shape of the Battle's history because Lawrence — like Schull — has added more to our enjoyment than to our understanding of the RCN's accomplishments.

James Lamb, *The Corvette Navy* (Toronto, Macmillan, 1977) is a more pretentious book by another former naval reservist. Lamb's account revolves around the theme of two solitudes — professional and reservist — within the wartime Navy. His contention that the professional Navy came ashore at the outbreak of war while the reservists went to sea is far too simplistic. The fact is that reservists vastly outnumbered professionals and consequently more went to sea — which was why they joined in the first place. On the whole Lamb's book is impressionistic and needs to be read cautiously. Moreover, those who like the humorous side of naval signals will still find Jack Broome's *Make a Signal!*¹⁰ required reading.

However, Lamb did touch on a vast and important subject — the internal politics of the RCN and its desire to create and entrench a large conventional navy in the Canadian defence establishment. Although Tucker alluded to this in his discussion of ship procurement programmes, the logic behind many of the Navy's actions was only recently laid bare by W.A.B. Douglas.¹¹ The war fought by the RCN between 1939 and 1945 was as much to anchor the Navy permanently as to beat the Germans. Similarly, the RCN had to fight for recognition within the Western Alliance. The Canadian dimension of this struggle is well-handled by W.G. Lund in his contribution to *The RCN in Retrospect*. His chapter, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the Northwest Atlantic", considerably advances our understanding of the formation of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic, the only theatre of war ever commanded by Canadians. However, the impact of the fight for recognition and entrenchment on the actual performance of the fleet is not tackled by either Douglas or Lund, and it is in any event hard to determine precisely. And yet MacIntyre clearly believed the Canadian desire to build a separate service was a key source of difficulties, a sentiment shared by Lamb.

None of these themes — enormous expansion, inefficiency, poor equipment, the reservist flavour of the wartime Navy, and the struggle for recognition — is adequate to fully explain the significance of Canada's naval war. Perhaps the biggest single fact overlooked by all historians is the direct relationship between the capabilities and flexibility of Canadian industry and the course of events at

10 Jack Broome, *Make a Signal!* (London, 1955).

11 W.A.B. Douglas, "Conflict and Innovation in the Royal Canadian Navy, 1939-1945", in G. Jordan, ed., *Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1977).

sea. There are a number of excellent studies of Canada's warship production, which illustrate and help explain the scope of the RCN's operational commitments. The most recent, Ken Macpherson and John Burgess, *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces 1910-1981* (Toronto, Collins, 1981) is in many respects the best and most comprehensive yet available. Not only are the many photos pleasing to the eye, but the raw data included in capsule histories of each ship and in the tables at the back contain a wealth of undigested material for researchers. The book's only serious drawback is its coffee-table format, which makes it much too large for easy use. However, the problem goes much deeper than simply counting ships. Escorts had to be maintained in fighting trim, and they had to be provided with an increasingly sophisticated array of modern weaponry and electronics. Poor equipment in Canadian escorts — principally corvettes — affected their operational deployment on at least one crucial occasion.¹² The reassignment of the Navy's mid-Atlantic escorts to a British command in early 1943 to re-equip and re-train effectively eliminated the RCN from the crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic. Only Thomas Lynch's *Canada's Flowers: A History of Canadian Flower Class Corvettes* (Halifax, Nimbus, 1981) has attempted to discuss the matter of equipment in any depth. Unfortunately, even the second, and much corrected, edition of Lynch's book suffers from a plethora of errors and incomplete research. Technical information on Canadian radars, for example, is suspect since virtually every corvette seems to be fitted with "SW2CQ", even those photographed in 1941 before the SW2C series went into service. Nor is *Canada's Flowers* a history of the class, because Lynch never tackles the design changes and innovations in a systematic way. The only reliable history of flower-class corvettes remains Raven and Preston's study, which deals essentially with British ships.¹³ A good book on Canada's principal escort class is still needed and the standards of research and scholarship achieved in recent work on Canadian aircraft prove that it can be done, and done well.¹⁴

The issue of the equipping and modernization of the operational fleet is absolutely central to the RCN's war. The small role played by the Navy in the final defeat of the U-Boat packs in April and May 1943 is evident from Schull's book: *The Far Distant Ships* skims over the period when scores of U-Boats were being destroyed almost as if there was nothing much to say about the RCN. Indeed, while British escorts sank dozens of U-Boats, the RCN was credited with only one and one-third kills in January to May 1943. The failure to keep the Navy modern and to reach its "quota" of kills eventually led to the replacement of the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral P.W. Nelles, in early 1944.

12 Marc Milner, "Royal Canadian Navy Participation in the Battle of the Atlantic Crisis of 1943", in Boutillier, ed., *The RCN in Retrospect*.

13 A. Preston and A. Raven, *Flower Class Corvettes* (London, 1973).

14 Larry Milberry, *The Avro CF-100* (Toronto, 1981).

But no historian has made the link between the poor performance of the Navy in 1943, the sacking of Nelles, and other developments, such as the Liberal Party's losses at the polls in August and the government's desire for international recognition of Canada's war effort. The latter caused Mackenzie King to commit the Army to Sicily in July, and was clearly behind the Canadian desire to host the Allied Conference at Quebec in August. Moreover, the Navy — unlike the Army — was very much the product of government action. Jack Pickersgill has recorded the Prime Minister's dismay at having to increase the size of the Army in Europe after strong public pressure in early 1940.¹⁵ In King's view, a large navy offered the prospect of a major armed contribution to the war effort, increased industrial output in ships, and fewer casualties, which meant averting the horror of conscription.¹⁶ But although by 1943 the Navy accounted for Canada's largest direct contribution to the actual fighting, it had proven unable to cope with U-Boats in an effective way and was unable to rescue the government from its difficulties.

Wartime industrial, labour and economic planning also affected events at sea. For example, most of the wartime fleet built in Canada came from central Canadian yards, with much of the balance from builders in British Columbia. Great Lakes yards were inaccessible to escorts fitted-out for operations and B.C. was much too far away. Maintenance therefore fell on Maritime yards, but by 1940 the major shipyards at Halifax and Saint John were fully occupied by emergency work on merchant shipping. When the Navy began to feel the effects of arduous operations and badly-needed repairs in 1942-43 it had nowhere to turn. The smaller Maritime yards, like those at Sydney, Pictou and Charlottetown, had all suffered from a lack of steady contracts, an aging workforce and the call-up of many of their young skilled tradesmen to the Army. The planning and utilization of skilled manpower had an impact on the ability of the RCN to maintain and adapt its fleet to a changing war. The RCN also found by 1943 that the Department of Munitions and Supply's Director of Ship Repairs and Salvage (who looked after civilian work) had first call on resources needed for ship repairs and refits. Part of the problem was poor naval Staff work, but the issue is far from settled. There was also the matter of labour peace. Work slowdowns or strikes in an aircraft plant, for example, delayed deliveries, but the long pipeline mitigated against disruptions at the operational end. However, work slowdowns in small Nova Scotia yards in late 1942 delayed the refitting of warships and compounded the fleet's maintenance — and therefore efficiency — problems.

Obviously a great deal of work remains to be done on the home front with respect to Canada's naval war. Historians have always paid lip service to

15 Jack Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1960).

16 In an interview given just before his death, Admiral L.W. Murray noted with some surprise that the government gave the RCN a virtual blank cheque in early 1940 to proceed with expansion: "Recollections", May 1970, L.W. Murray Papers, Vol. 4, Public Archives of Canada.

Halifax as the front line of the war, but they seldom go beyond this gesture. Graham Metson's fine little book on Halifax, *An East Coast Port* (Toronto, McGraw Hill-Ryerson, 1981) is undoubtedly the best effort to date. Through his photos and interviews Metson has captured the flavour of wartime Halifax. It would have been nice to see more on Halifax as a convoy port, since nowhere in the secondary sources is there a good account of the actual operations of assembling and sailing a convoy — something Halifax will forever be noted for. There is one tiny article on Sydney's wartime experiences,¹⁷ but there are no studies at all of other major east coast ports: Saint John, Quebec, Montreal. The whole story of the naval management of east coast traffic during the war and the work of Routing and Reporting Officers in each small Atlantic port, their links with the Commonwealth's global naval control of merchant shipping networks and the German campaigns in Canadian waters all remain to be told.¹⁸

Much of the interest in non-operational East Coast wartime developments has focused on the Navy's most notorious episode, the Halifax riots. Two recent books, James Cameron's *Murray the Martyred Admiral* (Hantsport, N.S., Lancelot Press, 1980) and Stanley Redman's *Open Gangway*, (Hantsport, N.S., Lancelot Press, 1981) come to vastly different conclusions about the role of the Navy in the VE-Day disturbances. Both authors give their opinions away in their titles. Cameron's hagiographic biography of Murray hopes to exonerate the RCN's best known flag officer, but the evidence of Murray's naval career is scant and forms only about a third of the book. It is, in any event, insufficient to support Cameron's argument that Murray's apparent failure in May 1945 was inconsistent with his previous accomplishments. The view of Murray as the penultimate naval officer is not widely held among specialists. Although he was a capable ship handler and an able administrator, Murray was not a brilliant flag officer. Redman's view is, not surprisingly, rather different. Although he admits that his account is not the last word, Redman hangs the blame squarely on the RCN and his choice of title indicates what he thought of Murray's decision to turn the sailors loose.

The problem with these and all existing accounts of the Halifax riots is that no one has yet gone behind the events and legal arguments to look at the principal characters. A good biography of Murray would help a great deal in understanding his actions, and at the same time reveal the internal politics of the navy. At the time of the Halifax riots, for example, the Chief of Naval Staff was Admiral G.C. Jones, a "political" officer and to a certain extent Murray's rival. By 1945

17 R.B. Mitchell, "Sydney Harbour — the War Years", in R.J. Morgan, ed., *More Essays in Cape Breton History* (Hantsport, N.S., 1977).

18 Tucker's second volume contains some material on naval control of shipping. A more concise account of Canadian involvement can be found in Marc Milner, *Canadian Naval Force Requirements in the Second World War* (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Extra-Mural Paper No. 20, 1981).

Jones had secured the top job in the RCN, but he was overshadowed by Murray's accomplishments as the Navy's most successful flag officer. While never openly hostile to one another, Murray and Jones disagreed on some very fundamental issues. Murray was certainly surprised, shocked and bitter about the failure of his own service to support him in the aftermath of the VE-Day events, and his dismissal from the RCN focused the burden of guilt upon him. It may prove impossible for historians to sort out what actually went on within the RCN in the summer of 1945, but without more analysis of the Naval side, the story of the Halifax riots will never be complete.

The historiography of the Battle of the Atlantic has been largely shaped by British authors. More than anyone else, they have decided which events were significant and which were not. RCN battles included are invariably disasters, and until very recently the only good accounts of Canadian battles were to be found in British and American publications. The only complete book on a Canadian convoy battle is by a former British merchant seaman who survived the loss of his ship, and whose story concentrates on the pathos of the battle not the struggling escorts.¹⁹ Certainly no Canadian has ever published a major book on an RCN battle — disaster or otherwise. Surely there were Canadian victories, and in any event the tragedies are also well worth the telling. Moreover, a study of some key RCN battles would pave the way for work on important Canadian escort group commanders and naval personalities such as Ken Dyer, "Dobby" Dobson, Jimmy Hibbard, Hugh Pullen, "Chummy" Prentice, J.H. Stubbs and D.C. Wallace.

The problem with the whole subject of the RCN and the Battle of the Atlantic is that we still have not got the basic story right. The key weakness of the historiography of Canada's naval war is the lack of a proper operational history. Fortunately there is hope, since the Armed Forces Directorate of History have recently announced their intention to undertake a new operational history. Unlike Schull or Tucker the Directorate's historians now have the advantage of a long view of the wartime events and many crucial recently declassified documents. Nonetheless, their task is a daunting one. The new operational history must not only cover the major story in the Atlantic, but it must also trace a myriad of tales — escort operations to Murmansk, in the Caribbean, in the English Channel and in the North Pacific, fleet destroyer operations in European waters, the activities of motor torpedo boats off occupied France, motor launches at home and abroad, amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, the development of a Naval Air Arm, and the participation of the cruiser HMCS *Uganda* in the Okinawa campaign. Through all of this they must trace the evolution of policy, ship procurement and design, the training of personnel, maintenance of the fleet, the production and supply of new equipment, and the exploits of the many RCN officers and men seconded to the

19 H. Revely, *The Convoy That Nearly Died* (London, 1979).

Royal Navy. The Directorate hopes to do all of this in one book. If the story of Canada's naval war is to be properly told it will have to be a very fat volume.

MARC MILNER

Antonine Maillet: A Writer's Itinerary

MORE THAN A DECADE has now passed since Antonine Maillet, the native of Bouctouche, New Brunswick, stunned audiences and readers alike with her brilliant text, *La Sagouine*,¹ a series of dramatic monologues centered on a long-suffering but lucid and courageous Acadian washerwoman, "qui est née avec le siècle, quasiment les pieds dans l'eau". This one-woman show, unforgettably acted by Viola Léger, was seen by thousands of people throughout Canada and the New England states, as well as in France, Belgium and Switzerland. The book containing the 16 monologues has sold some 100,000 copies. Maillet's literary career was crowned in 1979, when she won France's leading literary prize, the Prix Goncourt, for her novel, *Pélagie-la-Charrette*, the first Canadian writer to do so. Some one million copies of the original edition of *Pélagie* have been sold.

Although Antonine Maillet first came into prominence when *La Sagouine* was staged and printed in 1971, her writing career goes back some 25 years and rests on solid foundations. Born on 10 May 1929 to parents who were both school teachers, she was one of nine children.² Her father abandoned his teaching career and later became manager of the Irving general store in Bouctouche, an establishment evoked movingly by *la Sagouine* in the monologue, "Nouël", as she looks longingly at the fruits and chocolates displayed in the store window at the approach of Christmas. Maillet attended elementary school in her native town, then went to the Académie Notre-Dame du Sacré-Coeur in Memramcook and then to the Collège Notre-Dame d'Acadie in Moncton where she obtained her B.A. and M.A. She studied at the Université de Montréal and at Université Laval where she was granted, respectively, a *Licence ès lettres* and a doctorate, the latter for her study, *Rabelais et les traditions populaires en Acadie*.³ For a time she was a nun, her religious name being Soeur Marie-

1 (Montréal, Leméac, 1971). A second edition, containing interesting articles on the language and significance of the text, was issued in 1973 by the same publisher. Subsequent page references are to this latter edition. An English translation, bearing the original title, was published by Simon and Pierre, Toronto, 1979.

2 Biographical details have been culled from the *Dictionnaire des oeuvres littéraires du Québec*, III (Montréal, Fides, 1982), Laurent Lavoie's "Chronologie" in *La Revue de l'Université de Moncton*, VII, 2 (mars, 1974), and Dane Lanken, "L'Acadienne", in *Quest* (December, 1982).

3 (Québec, Presses de l'université Laval, 1971).