Finally, a question about the main assumption underlying Canada and the Burden of Unity. In so effectively underscoring the problems that the prairie and maritime regions have experienced the essayists have somewhat stacked the cards. The book says nothing about either the benefits which these regions gained from membership in the Canadian federation; nor do they hint that others may also carry part of the burden. While no one would take literally Mitch Hepburn's petulant complaint that Ontario was the "milch cow of Confederation", it would be equally misleading to picture it as a bloated parasite. In fact, one of the signs of Ontario's own growing "regionalism" is a paper, attached to the Province's 1977 Budget Statement, entitled "Federal Fiscal Redistribution within Canada". It effectively establishes the case that Ontario pays for a considerable share of the burden of unity, too.

My point is that the "regional" approach to Canadian history, and to its discontents, has both strengths and weaknesses. The whole may not be greater than the parts, but it is at least the sum of them. This stimulating book of essays could not be expected to deal with the entire question, though it is perhaps a bit overly emphatic about the red side of the ledger. Any final assessment of the relative gains and losses experienced by the various regions within our federal system must include, among many other things, a calculation of the impact of inter-regional transfers. But how can you measure the significance of the transfer of a central Canadian like David Bercuson to Calgary?

RAMSAY COOK


Canadian Intellectual History and the "Buzzing Factuality"

The traditional notion of the history of ideas, as represented by a book such as A. O. Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being, was to trace the development and permutations of great concepts over time, focusing on the major philosophers. The thoughts were usually studied quite independently of the thinkers, and typically in splendid isolation from the real world of society and action. In the past several decades, however, the history of ideas has been radically transformed, first into intellectual history by the Americans and then into histoire des mentalités by the French. The new approaches have insisted that great and original ideational formulations are historically less important than the constellations of unsystematic mental equipment (l'outillage mental) upon which most action is based, and that ideas must be seen
in their social and cultural context, related to action. At this point, it has been possible for students of Canada to get involved in a serious way. It no longer matters that we have not produced a Plato, Hobbes, or Adam Smith, or that our ideas have been derivative. The mentalités are part of the Canadian experience, and hence worth studying on their own merits.

Although one can no longer lament an absence of interest in intellectual history on the Canadian scene, its recent blossoming has been understandably marked by a good deal of confusion. Within the past few years two of the country’s brightest young historians have produced articles attempting to define intellectual history and explain its importance. Neither article calls attention to the activities of the French, an interesting commentary on the fragmented nature of scholarship in modern Canada, and neither article notes what the field’s greatest American practitioner — Perry Miller — argued as the principal value of the study of the collective mentality (or “Mind” as he called it). For Miller, most research projects on his specialist region of New England furnished “at their worst mere tables of statistics, on the average meaningless inventories, and at their best only a series of monographs”. He insisted that “such topics as ship, trade routes, currency, property, agriculture, town government and military tactics” were not quite useless, but that they “are not, and cannot be made, the central theme of a coherent narrative”. Miller found his coherent narrative in the New England Mind, and his superstructure, while nibbled away by the work of many revisionists, remains firmly in place.

Much of the Canadian past is characterized by the same sorts of problems — localism, uneven chronological development of settlement, frontier social conditions, derivative ideology — which faced students of early New England before Miller’s seminal work, and as Canadian historians increasingly move outside central Canada and beyond political chronology a coherent narrative becomes even more elusive. As Patricia Roy has recently observed, none of the standard textbooks in Canadian history really has any consistent conceptual framework. Perry Miller’s great insight — that unless what he called

3 The situation reviewed by Michael McGiffert in “American Puritan Studies in the 1960’s”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XXVII (1970), pp. 36-37, has not appreciably altered in the past few years.
the “buzzing factuality” of ever more “bewildering reality” is approached through the “comprehension of . . . ideas, it becomes even more a tumultuous chaos for us than it was for those caught in the blizzard” — applies equally cogently to the Canadian experience, as any reader of the “buzzing factuality” of the textbooks can ruefully attest. Miller insisted on the need for the historian to impose some order on the chaos of overwhelming details, and argued that only the life of the mind provides organizing principles.

Coherent frameworks based on mentalités cannot be created in vacuo, however much the metaphysical among us might like so to operate. Although few practitioners have been so far willing to schematize on a large time scale, nevertheless there are some suggestions of generalizing trends developing out of the new studies in Canadian intellectual history. The incipient frameworks for at least English Canada can perhaps best be seen operating in juxtaposition in the period from Confederation to 1930, an era about which three major studies of ideas have recently been published, each dealing implicitly with one of the three major Canadian “mentalités” slowly emerging from a scattered literature. We can perhaps call these “minds” the Tory Mind, the Liberal Mind, and the Progressive Mind. Each has had its own historical development, its own distinctive foreign borrowing pattern, and its own periods of particular dominance. On one level, it appears possible for Canadian history to be organized in terms of these Minds.

The Tory Mind, which dominated Canadian life in the early years of the nineteenth century and which has been most thoroughly analyzed in the works of S. F. Wise, was mainly English in its models. It emphasized a propertied elite, a stable and organic society, active government in church and state, and the British connection. The Liberal Mind partially succeeded the Tory Mind as the leading mentality by the second half of the nineteenth century, although the Tory ideals lingered on in the notions of imperialism. The Liberal Mind had its roots in the Scottish Enlightenment, stressing an educated elite, laissez-faire, individualism and private benevolence, often couched in metaphysical language. By the end of the nineteenth century, when both the Tory and Liberal traditions were in decay and disarray for their own reasons, a new vigorous Progressive Mind, largely American in origin, emerged as the dynamic feature of Canadian intellectual life. The Progressive Mind had its ancestors in men like William Lyon Mackenzie, but in the early twentieth century it found its strongest hold among those professional classes (clergymen, educators, social workers), who preached reform and social involvement.

All three minds shared a fair number of characteristics. While they borrowed extensively from abroad, their immediate influences came from English-speaking countries; the continent of Europe was involved only indirectly. They enjoyed together strong Protestant overtones, although each
had a denominational inclination. The Tory Mind was basically Anglican, the Liberal one Presbyterian, and the Progressive Methodist. All were in their own way elitist, often casting their attitudes in terms of Christian morality. By the beginning of the twentieth century, these Minds were all feeling the pressures of an increasingly secularized society, and all were becoming ever more disenchanted and critical of the power-oriented pragmatism of politics and industry in Canada. Each had solutions to the ills of modern industrial society.

As Carl Berger demonstrates in The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970), the Tory Mind entered the twentieth century emphasizing a nationalistic (almost jingoistic) imperialism and possessing a false sense of successful adaptation to the needs of the times. The United States, the embodiment of burgeoning urban industrial democracy, was the great Canadian bogeyman, and as Tories had always insisted, could only be kept at arm's length through the imperial connection. Imperialism resurrected the Loyalist tradition, wallowed in affection for the British constitution, and made a positive virtue of Canada's northern location. Not all imperialists had a Tory mentality, of course, although most of Berger's major figures certainly did. These imperialists were not without an evangelical streak, and translated their sense of religious mission into the Empire, inevitably secularizing it in the process. The extent to which the Tory Mind became committed to imperialism was considerable, and when World War I destroyed imperialism's credibility, Toryism virtually went down with the Empire.

As English models lost their viability, American ones naturally gained in importance. Richard Allen's The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada 1914-1928 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971), documents the shift. The Progressive Mind, as exemplified in the early years of the twentieth century by the Social Gospel movement, never lost touch with Britain, but it looked principally to the United States for its immediate inspiration. Like imperialism, the Social Gospel movement was a serious attempt to provide a rationale for dealing with the changing conditions of Canada, although many of its leaders were forced to abandon their earlier efforts to work through Christian institutions. The Social Gospel tried — unsuccessfully — to confront the new urban industrial order on its own grounds. If the Tory Mind foundered on the disillusionment of World War I, the Progressive Mind in its Social Gospel phase came to grief on Prohibition. But since many of the Progressives were willing to face the new order, a secularized Progressivism survived as the ideational basis of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

The outlines of the Liberal Mind are not so well documented for the period 1870-1930 as its Tory or Progressive counterparts, largely because S. E. D.
Shortt in *The Search for an Ideal: Six Canadian Intellectuals and their Convictions in an Age of Transition 1890-1930* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1976), has chosen to write a less coherent book than either Berger or Allen. Shortt's approach is not thematic but biographical, and his series of self-contained sketches of Canadian academics — each with biographical detail and analysis of beliefs — asks a good deal of the reader. The brief introduction and conclusion do not really make the most of the bulk of the text, and Shortt's attempts at generalisation often seem inadequate and occasionally even perverse. But although he does not — perhaps symptomatically — make the point, all of his figures (Sir Andrew Macphail, Archibald MacMechan, James Cappon, Maurice Hutton, Adam Shortt and James Mavor) are examples of the Liberal Mind. Perhaps other individuals could have been chosen to represent the Liberal mentality; one wonders what happened to Goldwin Smith for example. Perhaps other individuals could better represent the academy, for their university positions are the common occupational thread of the six men Shortt discusses. But assuming that the figures here are representative university types, then clearly the universities of Canada were one strong-hold of the Liberal Mind in the early years of this century.

While Shortt emphasizes the common academic background of his subjects, he does less than justice to two other unifying features: their intellectual positions and their strong sense of alienation from society. There is a close connection between these two aspects. All of these men received their intellectual inspiration from the tail-end of the Scottish Enlightenment. Scotland was a country which had lost its political and economic independence at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and perhaps the key feature of its substantial intellectual renaissance in the latter half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries was the extent to which its key figures increasingly produced intellectual systems which de-emphasized involvement and engagement in the exercise of power in political and economic spheres, thus rationalizing the realities of life for their Scottish audiences. That a Scot popularized *laissez-faire* was no accident. The separation of the intellectual from his society occurred very early in Scotland, and he increasingly moved in the life of the mind and toward the exaltation of formal education as a certification of excellence. Shortt's six figures are not the first refugees from the Scottish Enlightenment to come to Canada; men like Thomas McCulloch had arrived much earlier to found the universities. Those Scots and Scots-influenced individuals who dominated higher education in Canada might not have agreed in their metaphysics (a legitimate because safe area of disagreement), but they were uniformly hostile to the wielders of political and economic power. Shortt argues that his six academics were perceptive social critics, but surely the more important point
is that they insisted on being of the world but not in it. Lest anyone think that such alienation was a Liberal characteristic, it should be emphasized that, for different reasons, it was shared by all the mentalities.

While it might seem that the Minds above discussed could serve to bring order out of chaos of Canadian history, such a conclusion would be premature, largely because one can hardly avoid being struck by the extent to which, in all these books, the Canadian intellectual of the period 1870-1930 was impotently removed from the power-worlds of politics, government, and industry. Moreover, the articulation of the major Minds in this era seems to have been largely confined to members of those professional classes — the clergy, the educators, the doctors, the social workers — who had won intellectual independence at the expense of active involvement in the secular power structures. To some degree, this observation may be a product of the implicit selection processes of Berger, Allen, and Shortt, who have chosen to focus on the articulations of professionals rather than political leaders or businessmen. But on the whole, one can accept that the authors have gone to the spokesmen for the mentalities, and can expect that the politicians and captains of industry had few principles beyond power, or palely reflected the dominant mentalities, or perhaps both. In any event, as Berger points out, few of the leaders of imperialism ever held an elective office or managed a business. Allen’s social gospellers worked largely outside the corridors of government and industry, either holding conferences in which few working politicians or businessmen seemed to say much, or embracing the victims of the system as in the People’s Churches. Shortt’s professors, with the possible exception of Adam Shortt, deliberately eschewed participation in the world of political or economic power.

The alienation of the makers of the minds is by no means the recent phenomenon it is usually taken for, and has had an enormous impact upon Canadian development. Almost without exception the men and women in these books adopted an elitist view of Canadian society. They might not have agreed on who should constitute the elite or what its characteristics ought to be, but they were certain they were of it, and that they were both intellectually — and morally — superior. They also knew who did not constitute the elite. Politicians and industrialists, being stupid and corrupt, had to be eliminated or reformed out of recognition. The result was a cynicism about business and politics in the age of advancing industrialism which led to a messianic and impractical urge for change, usually with simplistic panaceas and often with nostalgic harkenings back to the older rural values of the vanishing Canada. It is amazing how strong was the agrarian myth among men who had escaped the grinding existence of the farm and had no intention of ever returning to it. Stephen Leacock’s comical efforts to play a country squire each summer in Orillia reflect just such an ambivalence. In
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turn, men of power saw the intellectuals, as Leacock once observed, as individuals with minds "defective and damaged by education". As Shortt rightly comments, his intellectuals "tended to place themselves, in practical terms, outside Canadian society" (p. 6). So did most of the other leading intellectual figures of the time.

Canada's intellectuals as early as the end of the nineteenth century were not only alienated, but powerless. They had in effect abdicated. If the world of power did not restrain the gossamer spinnings of the imperialists and social gospellers, at the same time the creative and essentially moral spirit and energies of the intellectuals of the period did not really much influence the activities of the men who made the political and economic decisions in Canada. We now have enough evidence to indicate that the impotency of the Canadian intellectual is a tradition of long standing, going back indeed nearly to Confederation. We do not yet know whether the alienation goes back still further, though I would suspect it does not, for it is inherent in a specialization of function which was alien to the less sophisticated colonial society of the pre-Confederation period. John Strachan and William Lyon Mackenzie may not have triumphed, but they were involved. Perry Miller's successful portrayal of early New England through the Puritan Mind may be unreplicable for later Canada, not because Canadian Minds did not exist, but because they had ceased to be integrated into the society.

In any event, the next step for intellectual history in Canada is clearly to investigate the relationship between ideas and the exercise of power. We have had a number of calls for such an investigation, but unfortunately, the works of Berger, Allen, and Shortt seem more to demonstrate the growing chasm between Minds and Power than the dynamics between them. So far Canadian intellectual history has neither succeeded in altering the standard perception that ideas did not much matter in the making of this nation, or in explicating what Perry Miller called the "buzzing factuality".

J. M. BUMSTED

Women's History: the State of the Art in Atlantic Canada

"The history of women no longer needs defending". So Susan Mann Trofimenkoff and Alison Prentice confidently begin their introduction to The Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women's History (Toronto, McClelland Stewart, 1977). The rebirth of women's history in the 1970s takes its impetus from the contemporary resurgence of feminism. ¹ Canadian